Volume 4
Issue 1 Winter
Fall 1973

Self-Help Repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code: The
Constitutionality of Article 9, Section 503
Steven Kurt Sanders

Recommended Citation
Steven K. Sanders, Self-Help Repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Constitutionality of
Article 9, Section 503, 4 N.M. L. Rev. 75 (1973).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol4/iss1/6

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

NOTES
SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF ARTICLE 9, SECTION 503
Recent decisions' in the field of consumer and commercial law
have cast considerable doubt upon the constitutionality of peaceful
repossession of goods as authorized by Article 9, Section 503 of the
2
Uniform Commercial Code. (U.C.C.) The Code allows a creditorseller to protect his interest in continuous payments by private repossession without notice and hearing. In part, Article 9, Section 503
provides as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to
take possession of the collateral. In taking possession, the secured
party may proceed without judicial process if this3can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.
This provision is typically used in the repossession of consumer
goods such as automobiles. The debtor-buyer usually falls behind in
his payments either because he simply cannot meet them or because
the good has broken down and he has refused to continue payments
until the creditor-seller makes repairs. The debtor-buyer may believe
that he has a warranty which covers repairs and that he is thus
justified in refusing payment. Little does the consumer know, but
the seller is no longer interested in collecting payments, much less in
repairing the goods, because he (the seller) has already sold the con1. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz,
11 UCC Rep. Serv. 627, 4 CCH Sec. Trans. Guide 52,007 (1§72); James v. Pinnix, 4 CCH
Sec. Trans. Guide 52,172 (1973); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 42 U.S.L.W.
2116 (Mass. 1973); Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 543 (D. Vt. 1973); Oiler
v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Kipp v. Cozens, 4 CCH Sec. Trans.
Guide 51,980 (1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1,295 A.2d 402
(1972); Kirksey v. Theilig, 4 CCH Sec. Trans. Guide 52,003 (1972); Green v. First National Bank of Virginia, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Plante v. Industrial National
Bank of Rhode Island, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 739 (1973); Colvin v. Avco Financial Services of
Ogden, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 25 (D. Utah 1973); Pease v. Havelock National Bank, 351
F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Brown v. United States National Bank of Oregon, 12 UCC
Rep. Serv. 549, 96 Ore. Adv. Sheets 1667 (1973); Northside Motors of Florida, Inc. v.
Brinkley, 42 U.S.L.W. 2115 (1973). See also, 5 Conn.L. Rev. 294 (1972); 140 St. Louis L.
Rev. 127 (1972); 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1503 (1972); 4 Texas Tech L. Rev. 23
(1972); 22 Catholic U. L. Rev. 667 (1973); 45 Temp. L.Q. 275 (1972); 3 Loyola L. Rev.
451 (1972).
2. All Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter U.C.C.) references to 1972 official text
unless otherwise noted.
3. For definition of "secured party," see U.C.C. § 9-105. There is no definition of
"breach of the peace" within the Code itself.
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tract of sale (note) to a finance company "without recourse." 4 The
consumer has no right of action against the finance company since it
can claim freedom from the personal defense of breach of warranty
because of its status as a holder in due course of a negotiable note.'
The finance company now repossesses the good because it feels "insecure" 6 or because the consumer refuses to make payments. If the
good is an automobile, the repossession is typically accomplished by
"hot wiring" the car in the consumer's driveway or garage or even in
a supermarket parking lot while the consumer is shopping. 7
Because many finance companies (and sellers) use such underhanded methods, a large number of cases has arisen challenging the
constitutionality of Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
At present Section 9-503 has been declared unconstitutional by at
least five courts 8 and the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Fuentes v. Shevin 9 has given considerable impetus to the
constitutional challenges to this section of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
The question posed by self-help repossession via the type of
creditor conduct discussed above, and the question with which this
note will deal is whether "peaceful repossession" of goods by a private party without notice or hearing affords a debtor due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Fourteenth
Amendment is directed only at that action which may fairly be said
to be state action,'" this note will be divided into two parts. The
first part will consider whether self-help repossession constitutes
4. U.C.C. § 3-414 provides that where a seller endorses a note "without recourse" he

disclaims obligations to pay the note should the consumer default.
5. U.C.C. § 3-302, § 3-J)5. The finance company may also be able to claim that it is a
good faith assignee of a cdntract containing a "cut-off clause," which serves as the contractual equivalent of negotiability. U.C.C. § 9-206.

6. U.C.C. § 1-208, § 2-210, and § 2-609.

7. The Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1970, at 1, col. 1, contained an informative article
about the unscrupulous methods used by "repo men." Note that according to the author of

Article Nine "[i] n the underworld of consumer f'mance... repossession is a knock-down,
dragged-out battle waged on both sides with cunning guile and a complete disregard for the
rules of fair play." 2 Gilmore 1212. See also, D. Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More, 161-167
(1963). This section of the book outlines repossession abuses perpetrated on low-income
consumers. See also Cohen, Default Repossession, Foreclosure,and Deficiency. A Journey
to the UnderworldAnd a ProposedSalvation, 51 Ore. L. Rev. 302, 310 (1972).
8. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S. D. Cal. 1972); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz,
11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 627 (1972), 4 CCH Secured Transactions Guide 52,007 (1972);
Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co. 42 U.S.L.W. 2116 (Mass. Aug. 28, 1973); James
v. Pinnix, 4 Secured Transactions Guide 52,172 (S.D. Miss. 1973); Michel v. Rex-Noreco,
Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 543 (D. Vt. 1972).
9. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
10. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part as follows: "[NJor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law..."
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state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The second
part will consider whether self-help repossession without prior notice
and hearing violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment assuming there is state action. The second part of the
note will also examine the possibility that Section 9-503 creates an
effective waiver of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
THE REQUIREMENT OF STATE ACTION

The question presented by this part is whether the passage of a
law,' ' which allows, authorizes or encourages private individuals to
"peacefully repossess" collateral, is sufficient action by the state to
invoke the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More
specifically, is there sufficient state action involved in the passage of
Section 9-503 to invoke the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment when a private person acts pursuant to, under the authority of,
under the encouragement of, or in a manner allowed by Section
9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code?
The thesis of this part is that the State acts, within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, whenever it defines, enforces or adjudicates a right-duty relationship. "When state law is applied to
determine legal relations between private persons, there is 'state action.'

"' 2

More explicitly, "State law, defining legal relations be-

tween private persons is clearly the product of 'action' of a state, and
is, therefore, subject to the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment on state action."' ' Self-help repossession as defined,
authorized or enforced under Section 9-503 is hence the product of
state action because Section 9-503 defines legal relations between
11. Note U.C.C. § 9-503 is a codification of the common law right of self-help, II
Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law II 574-577 (2d ed. 1898); 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 278-287 (1966 reprint).
12. Horowitz, The Misleading Search For "State Action" Under The FourteenthA mendment, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208, 209 (1957). Horowitz' major premise is that "whenever, and
however, a state gives legal consequences to transactions between private persons there is
'state action'-i.e., that the definition by a state of legal relations between private persons is,
for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a matter of 'state action.'" Id. at 209,
221. Other commentators espousing this theory include Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black,
ConstitutionalReview, and The Talisman of State Action, 1965 Duke L. J. 219, 241-245;
Horowitz, FourteenthAmendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing,
52 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1964); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Texas L. Rev. 347
(1963); Van Alstyne and Karst, 14 Stan. L. Rev. (1961).
13. Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private"
Housing, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1964). It was Horowitz' contention that "[w]hen the legal
interests of two private persons are in conflict, state law determining the legal relationship
between those persons with regard to the matter in issue is, in ultimate effect, a preference
for one person's interests over the interests of the other." Id. at 5.
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private persons. Section 9-503 is therefore subject to the limitations
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is argued by those who support the constitutionality of Section
9-503 that since the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action, and since a security agreement is
only a private contract whose terms are self-executing, 4 there is no
significant state involvement such that the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment could be invoked. This is especially true, it is
argued, since self-help repossession is by definition action by a private person since no state officer is involved. The constitutionality of
the provision is further supported by the assertion that the act of
repossession is not solely dependent upon statutory authority but
may be provided for in the security agreement itself.' I The taking
would then be pursuant to a private contract involving no state
action. Finally; it is argued that self-help repossession is an ancient,
common-law remedy and is, therefore, constitutional. 6
It is, no doubt, "a commonplace that rights under the equal protection clause, itself, arise only where there has been involvement of
the state or one acting under color of its authority. . .

."

Such in-

volvement, however, need not "be either exclusive or direct ... ";
14. Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972); Kipp v.
Cozens, 4 CCH Secured Transactions Guide 51,980 (Cal. 1972).
15. A typical security agreement provides as follows:
The secured party shall also have all of the rights and remedies of a secured
party under the California Uniform Commercial Code, or other applicable law,
and all rights and remedies shall, to the extent permitted by law, be cumulative. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, upon the occurrence of
any such event of default the secured party is entitled to take possession of
the vehicle and to take such other measures as secured party may deem necessary for the protection of the vehicle.
Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S. D. Cal. 1972). With language of this sort, which
led the court in Kipp v. Cozens, to hold as follows:
If the contract and the pre-Commercial Code law clearly gave the seller the
right to repossess on default by the buyer, what has Commercial Code § 9-503
added?
This section doesn't authorize the state to do anything. It merely recognizes
the parties' right to contract in this manner if they so desire. This being so, the
court must hold that § 9-503 plays a most insignificant, if any, part in this
transaction.
The parties contracted to do what they could do with or without § 9-503,
and as a result of the terms of the contract and petitioner's default, the
property was repossessed, just as it could have been if § 9-503 had never been
enacted. The Court holds that Commercial Code § 9-503 in these circum-

stances do not constitute state action so as to bring into play the due process

provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 51,980.
16. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S. D. Cal. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342
F. Supp. 21 (N. D. Cal. 1972); Kipp v. Cozens, 4 CCH Secured Transactions Guide 51,980
(Cal. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972); Cf.
note 11 supra.
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and it has been found "even though the participation of the state was

peripherial or its action was only one of several cooperative forces
leading to the constitutional violation. . .

."'

" So it is well settled

that governmental approval or involvement in private conduct "need
not reach the level of compulsion to clothe what is otherwise private
discrimination with 'state action.' "' 8
There is no closed category of acts or conduct that will so involve

the state as to make the Fourteenth Amendment applicable.' The
test is state responsibility or encouragement. The cases that have
been decided by the court show some contribution by the state to
the carrying on of the activity in the form of enablement, encouragement or approval. Among the many kinds of conduct that have been

held to amount to state involvement are: the permission, toleration
or approval of discrimination under the authority of, but not the
compulsion of, state law; 2 the denial or refusal by the state of an
effective remedy for irreparable injury inflicted by the invasion of a

constitutional right;2 ' and the authorization of the entrance into an
agreement (even though the making thereof is permissive) by two

private entities, a labor union and an employer. 2 2 All are subject to
constitutional scrutiry.
In the last example, the United States Supreme Court held that,
17. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-756 (1966). See also United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
18. Simkins v. The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959, 968 (4th Cir.
1963).
19. Burton v.Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 725-26 (1960).
20. McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, 235 U.S. 151,161-162
(1914); Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946). Note in McCabe, it was held that,
It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if
he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of
a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which under
substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another traveler, he may
properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded. McCabe
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, 235 U.S. 151, 161-162
(1914).
21. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329-330 (1921). It was held in Truax v. Corrigan,
that,
"... the legislative power of a State can only be exerted in subordination to
the fundamental principles of right and justice which the guaranty of due
process in the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve, and that a
purely arbitrary or capricious exercise of that power whereby a wrongful and
highly injurious invasion of property rights, as here, is practically sanctioned
and the owner stripped of all real remedy, is wholly at variance with those
principles.
Id. at 329-330. Truax exemplifies the principle that a state's preference in its laws for one
person's interest over another's which involves state action.
22. Railway Employees' Department, American Federation of Labor v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (1956).
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If private *rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement

made pursuant to federal law

.

. The enactment of the federal

statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental
action on which the constitution operates,
2 3 though it takes a private
agreement to invoke the federal sanction.
Applying these concepts to the present problem (and for convenience labeling it as Theory One), since state law authorizes the
Section 9-503 agreement and indeed writes it into the contract for
the parties should they fail to,2 the state has acted within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment state action concept because
private rights are being invaded by force of an agreement made pursuant to state law. The private rights being invaded involve the freedom to contract as one chooses and the right of notice and hearing
before repossession. The agreement is made pursuant to state law
because state law authorizes the self-help repossession whether or not
the contract provides for it.
However, the state has acted in more ways than the mere authorization of self-help repossession. The state through Section 9-503 has
removed any possible doubt as to the legality of self-help repossession. The codification of self-help in Section 9-503 has also prevented the development of any common law remedies against selfhelp repossession. Such judicial remedies might have been forthcoming because, "the first business of the law and more especially
the law of crime and tort is to suppress self help."'2
The state has thus invaded private rights by: (1) writing a self-help
provision into every secured contract whether or not the parties
bargain for it; (2) placing the burden on the debtor to expressly
contract self-help out of the agreement because self-help is a part of
the contract "unless otherwise agreed;" 2 6 (3) removing any possible
doubt as to the legality of self-help repossession; and (4) precluding
the growth of any possible judicial remedy for self-help repossession.
Thus, under Theory One, the enactment of 9-503 is the governmental action on which the Constitution may operate. 2 7
There are four other theories upon which state action can be
found in self-help repossession. A second theory (Theory Two)
23. Id. at 232.
24. U.C.C. § 9-503 provides for self-help, "unless otherwise agreed...
25. 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 278 (1966 reprint). For a contrary view
see Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 767 (1973).
26. U.C.C. § 9-503.
27. Railway Employees' Department American Federation of Labor v. Hanson is distinguishable because the union shop agreements were prohibited by law until Congress passed a
federal act. Self-help has not been so prohibited.
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argues that state action is present because the state enforces the
2
self-help repossession provisions in private security agreements. 8 In
a law suit between private parties, there can be no doubt that the
application by the courts of a state's common law constitutes state
action which must conform to the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 9 The leading case in support of this theory is Shelley
v Kraemer 3 0 where the court held that by judicial enforcement of a
privately negotiated convenant (one which restricted sale to whites
only) the state had "denied petitioners the equal protection of the
3
laws" and that, therefore, the action of the state could not stand. '
The court did not hold that the contract was invalid, but only that it
was unenforceable. As stated in a later case which expanded the
doctrine of Shelley,
Voluntary adherence would constitute individual action only. When,
however, the parties cease to rely upon voluntary action to carry out
the convenant and the state is asked to step in and give its sanction
to the enforcement of the convenant ...[the effect] would be to
encourage the use of restrictive convenants. To that extent, the state
32
would act to put its sanction behind the covenants.

Applying that principle to the present question, if the state enforces
self-help repossessions in the courts and thus encourages the use of
self-help repossession, it has acted within the meaning of Shelley v
33
Kraemer and the Fourteenth Amendment. The state is also enforcing Section 9-503 when it does not declare it invalid. To not act, is to
act. Note that by the express terms of the Code, self-help provisions
may be utilized without court action.3 4
In summary, Theory Two reasons that there is state action in28. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
29. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Edwards v. Habib,
397 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir. 1968). In Times the state did not initiate the action nor did it
encourage the private parties involved to do so; it merely provided courts and laws to settle
essentially private disputes. See note 63, infra.
30. 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
31. Id. at 20.
32. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1952).
33. The holding in Shelley was reaffirmed in the companion case of Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24 (1948), where the court expressly held that "[wlhere the enforcement of private
agreements would be violative ...(of the United States Constitution) it is the obligation of
courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial power." 334 U.S. at 35.
34. "The creation, modification, and destruction of rights and property are controlled,
not by individual action, itself, but by the legal consequences which a state attaches to it."
Brief for the United States of America as amicus curiae, at 51 in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334

U.S. 1 (1948). See also Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colurn. L. Rev. 1083, 1109

(1960), wherein it states "that courts must act when parties apply to them,-even refusal to
act is a positive declaration of law-."
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volved not only in the passage of Section 9-503 but in its operation
and in its enforcement by the courts. Any one is sufficient to invoke
the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The third theory (Theory Three) argues that state action is present
because Section 9-503 authorizes and encourages self-help repossession. The leading case in support of this theory is Reitman v
Mulkey. 3 5 Reitman is relied upon by several of the courts which
have held that self-help repossession under Section 9-503 involves
state action. 3 6 Reitman involved the constitutionality of an amendment to the California constitution which provided that the state
could not limit or abridge the right of any person to sell or decline to
sell his property to anyone he desired.' 7 The United States Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of the California Supreme Court which
held that the amendment was invalid as denying equal protection of
the law. The California court held that, although neutral on its face,
the amendment established "a purported constitutional right to privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly would be unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment should state action be
involved." 3 8 The California and United States Supreme Courts held
that a "prohibitive state involvement could be found even where the
State can be charged only with encouraging rather than commanding
discrimination."'3 9 Summarizing and adopting the California Supreme Court decision in Reitman the United States Supreme Court
held that:
The intent of Section 26 was to authorize private racial discriminations on the housing market, to repeal the Unruh and the Rumford
Acts and to create a constitutional right to discriminate on racial
grounds on the sale and leasing of real property. Hence the court
(California Supreme Court) dealt with Section 26 as though it expressly authorized and constitutionalized the private right to dis35. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
36. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S. D. Cal. 1972). See also Boland v. Essex County

Bank & Trust Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 2116 (Mass. 1973); Jones v. Pinnix, 4 CCH Secured Transactions Guide 52,172 (S.D. Miss. 1973); Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.

543 (D. Vt. 1972).
37. The California amendment in Reitman provided in part as follows,

Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit, or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all his real property, to decline to sell, lease or
rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 372 (1967) n. 2.
38. 64 Cal. 2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825, 830 (1966).
39. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967). Other cases which have held that
private action is subject to constitutional scrutiny when the state has encouraged or
sanctioned it include Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273 (1963); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249,254 (1953) and Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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criminate. Third, the court (California Supreme Court) assessed the
ultimate impact of Section 26 (the constitutional amendment) in the
California environment and concluded that this section would
encourage and significantly involve the state in private racialdiscrim4
ination contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment " (emphasis

added).
Can it be doubted that the intent of the state in passing Section
9-503 was to authorize, encourage, legalize and significantly involve
itself in peaceful repossessions? If not, then one must conclude that
the state is acting when a private person makes a peaceful repossession as allowed by Section 9-503.
In an effort to show how the state was encouraging discrimination,
the United States Supreme Court asserted that "those practicing
racial discriminations need no longer rely solely on their personal
choice. They could now invoke express constitutional authority free
from censure or interference of any kind from official sources."'
To paraphrase the court, those practicing prejudgment seizure of
property without hearing need no longer rely solely on their personal
choice7 or their personal contract. They may now invoke express
legislative authority, 4free from censure or interference of any kind
from official sources. 2
The fact that those who practice self-help repossession need no
longer rely solely on their personal choice was first brought out in
the discussion of Theory One concerning the writing of Section
9-503 into every security agreement whether self-help is bargained
for or not. It is because private individuals need no longer rely on
their personal choice that they are encouraged to repossess.
The basis for the Supreme Court's holding in Reitman was that the
California constitutional amendment encouraged discrimination by
private individuals. 4 3 Encouragement by the state is present to a
greater degree here than in Reitman because Section 9-503 does not
even purport to be neutral. First, it prohibits the state from limiting
or abridging the right to self-help repossession (so long as 9-503 is
statewide). Second, Section 9-503 prohibits the judiciary from developing common law precedents against the right of self-help. Third,
40. 387 U.S. at 376 (1967).
41. Id. at 377.
42. Many states have laws which provide for the creditor to give notice to the local police
department of any repossessions. After seizure, the police department then informs the
debtor of the seizure. cf Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-6-44 (Cun. Supp. 1969).
43. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Barrows v. Jackson
346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 485-486 (1962).
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and most significant, Section 9-503 writes into every security agreement self-help provisions unless the parties agree otherwise. Thus, the
burden is on the parties to take affirmative action to exclude self-help
from their contract.4 4 Fourth, Section 9-503 gives the seller rights
which were not bargained for. The seller is granted the luxury of
deciding whether to exercise rights which the parties may never have
discussed and which need not be provided for in the contract.
Reitman held that the state is encouraging a deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights when it allows parties to decide with
whom they may contract. If that is state action by encouragement,
can it be seriously contended that a law which modifies a private
contract and gives one party more rights than he bargained for is not
also state action by encouragement. This encouragement would exist
even if the conlract itself provided for self-help because the seller
would be able to rely on Section 9-503 to support his contractual
right to repossession.
The state's involvement in the decision of whether or not to contract is much less significant, in terms of state action, than the state's
involvement in writing the terms of a private contract. In the first
instance, the state merely says you do not have to contract if you do
not want to. In the other, the state says that if you do contract, your
contract will contain a self-help provision unless you expressly decide
otherwise. A decision to include self-help repossession in the contract
is made for the parties without any action by either of them. At least
the decision whether or not to contract was left to the parties in
Reitman. The significance of the state's actions becomes more
apparent when one considers that the state has made self-help a
statutory right. This is much more than inaction or indifference to
self-help. The state has made a formal, deliberate and purposeful
choice in enacting the statute and has, thus, encouraged its citizens
to resort to self-help instead of the judicial process.
Reitman was distinguished by several lower courts' s because of a
supposed element of intentional circumvention of the Fourteenth
Amendment which is not involved in Section 9-503.6 One lower
federal court held pursuant to this theory that:
in cases involving racial discrimination, there is a long history of
state attempts to do indirectly what the states knew they were pro44. U.C.C. § 9-503.
45. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy
Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972); Kirksey v. Theilig, C.C.H. Secured
Transactions Guide,
52,003 (Dist. Ct. Colo. 1972); Kipp v. Cozens, C.C.H. Secured
Transactions Guide, 51,980 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972); Green v. First National Exchange Bank
of Virginia, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
46. Kirksey v. Theilig, C.C.H. Secured Transactions Guide 52,003, at 67,098.
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hibited from doing-directly-encouraging or enforcing racial discrimination. (cases omitted) Thus there is an element of intentional
circumvention in Reitman and similar cases that is completely lacking here.4 7
It should be noted, however, that Reitman is not the only decision
to hold that mere encouragement by the state constitutes state action. 4 8 In three of these cases the state had no statutory law which
would suggest that the state was attempting to circumvent the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment. The only state action
found in one case was the enforcement of a private contract by the
courts. Thus, in Barrows v Jackson it was held that "the action of a
state court at law to sanction the validity of the restrictive convenant
here involved ...

constitutes state action ....

Neither racial discrimination nor intentional circumvention of
Fourteenth Amendment rights is the single key to Reitman, and it
5
should not be distinguished on such grounds. 0 The reason that the
question of intent was involved in Reitman was because the constitutional amendment was seemingly neutral on its face. It merely stated
that the seller of property could sell or not sell to whomever he
chose. Section 9-503 does not even give an illusion of neutrality. The
state has clearly sided with the creditor to the detriment of the
debtor by rewriting the parties' contract.' 1 The state's intent under
Section 9-503 is clear.
Reitman has also been distinguished because it involved racial discrimination. One court held that,
Reitman, which dealt with racial discrimination in violation of the
due process clause clearly presented a compelling factual situation to
which the civil rights acts and their jurisdictional counterparts were
designed to apply. The historical, legal and moral considerations
fundamental to extending federal jurisdiction5 2to meet racial injustices are simply not present in the instant case.
Concerning this contention one should merely note that although the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to eliminate racial discrimination, it has never been held by the Supreme Court to be limited
strictly to cases dealing with racial discrimination. In the Slaughter47. Id.
48. See note 43, supra.

49. 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
50. State action has been found when state officials act in direct violation of state law.
Clearly the state cannot be said to intend violation of its own law. Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S.
167 (1961).
51. See, Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the
Underworldand a Proposed Salvation, 51 Ore. L. Rev. 302 (1972).

52. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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house cases,' I the first to construe the civil rights amendments, the
United States Supreme Court held:
if other rights (those not based on race) are assailed by the states
which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these
articles that protection will apply, though the parties interested may
not be of African descent. 5 4
Concededly, racial classifications "bear a far heavier burden of
justification,"'5 than other classifications. However, this pertains to
the constitutionality of the particular statute or state action. It has
nothing to do with whether or not the state has acted. Its only
significance is that the statute will be subjected to the court's most
"rigid scrutiny."' 6 Logically, if the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to situations other than discrimination based on race, then an interpretation of what constitutes sufficient action to bring the amendment into play should apply to any situation within the purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment although there is no racial discrimination involved. The holding in Reitman was that a state law which was
intended to encourage or authorize deprivation of Fourteenth
Amendment rights (as § 9-503 does) is unconstitutional, whether the
law compels the deprivation or merely leaves the possibility of deprivation to the discretion of the private citizen. The test in Reitman
of what constitutes state action should not be confined to cases
dealing with racial discrimination.
A third basis for distinguishing Reitman was that the California
amendment repealed existing state laws which prohibited discrimination. - 7 Clearly this fact did not enter into the decisions because the
United States Supreme Court expressly held that the California
Supreme Court, "did not read either our cases nor the Fourteenth
Amendment as establishing an automatic barrier to the repeal of an
existing law prohibiting racial discrimination in housing."s "
A fourth basis for distinguishing Reitman and holding that selfhelp does not involve state action was succinctly stated as follows:
It cannot be that codifying a generally understood practice of
ancient and honorable lineage and surrounding it with safeguards
53. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). See also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Scher v. Board of Education, 424 F.2d 741, 743 (3rd Cir.
1970); Martynn v. Darcy, 333 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. La. 1971).
54. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872).
55. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964); See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385, 392 (1969), and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
56. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969).
57. Kirksey v. Theilig, C.C.H. Secured Transactions Guide 52,003.
58. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967).
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renders the practice unconstitutional.... Codification of the practice of self.help recaption by the enactment of 9-503 cannot so give
that practice the color of state law as to take it out of the private
area and make it subject to the Fourteenth Amendment."'
An argument which closely parallels this is that since self-help had
been recognized prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, it must be constitutional.6 0
The fallacy in the first argument is the failure to distinguish between state action and the constitutionality of that action. The state
acts just as much when it follows and enforces the common law as
when it follows and enforces its statutory law. 6 The constitutionality of the state's action is, of course, another question. The United
States Supreme Court has explicitly held on a number of occasions
that a state's enforcement of the common law is as much state action
as is its enforcement of its statutory law. 6" For there to be state
action, the state need merely provide courts in which a suit may be
brought if the state's common law provides a doctrine upon which
the suit will be settled. "The test is not the form in which the state's
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power
has in fact been exercised." 6 3
The second argument, that codification of the right of self-help
does not change private acts into state actions, is answered by the
case of Griffin v. Maryland.6 4 There the United States Supreme
Court held:
If an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act
under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that he
might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private
capacity or that the particular action which he took was not authorized by state law. 65
59. Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 NJ. Super. 1,295 A.2d 402,406 (1972). The
court cited the following authority: 2 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law,
574 (2d Ed. 1968); 2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (with analysis by T.
Cooley, 4th Ed. 1899), 856-858.
60. 121 N.J. Super. 1,295 A.2d 406.
61. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-3 (Repl. 1970) which expressly adopts the common law
rule in New Mexico. Cf. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) where the court found state action in a state's
enforcement of its common law. For a later case see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
62. See note 61 supra.
63. New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265. Note: Sullivan involved a
civil law suit between private parties. The Supreme Court held that, "the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law ...It matters not that the law has been applied in a civil
action and that it is a common law only, though supplemented by statute..
64. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
65. Id. at 135.
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Thus, the argument that the state has done no more than codify a
right that was purely private, or one that is already possessed by
private persons, must fall. It should also be noted that the constitutional amendment passed in Reitman merely stated that a private
person could sell his property to whomever he pleased without interference of any kind from the state, a private right long recognized in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The Reitman court said:
It has been recognized that the action of state courts in enforcing a
substantive common law rule formulated by these courts, may result
in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
even though the judicial proceedings in such cases may have been in
complete accord
with the most rigorous conceptions of procedural
66
due process.

The mere fact that "a procedure would pass muster under a feudal
regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in
6
modem form." '
The rationale of Reitman has been followed and indeed expanded
in recent years. In the case of Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 6 I
Justice Brennan, concurring and dissenting, expressed his views as to
the logical extension of Reitman as follows:
When private action conforms with state policy, it becomes a manifestation of that policy and is thereby drawn within the ambet of
state action....

A private person acts under color of a state statute or other law
when he, like the other official in some way acts consciously pursuant to some law which gives him aid, comfort or incentive. 6 9
Under Justice Brennan's view of state action, the court should recognize state action in self-help repossession not only because the state
has encouraged it, but also because it conforms with state policy."'
66. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1942).
67. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
68. 398 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J.).
69. Id. at 203, 212.
70. Several lower courts have embraced Brennan's viewpoint. See Collins v. Viceroy
Hotel Corporation, 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. I1M.1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109
(N.D. Cal. 1970); Hall v.Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). See also note 20, supra. The
Reitman and Adickes cases were followed in the recent decision of Moose Lodge v. Irvis
where the Supreme Court enjoined the enforcement of a state regulation because the
regulation required the club to follow its rules and those rules prescribed racial
discrimination. The court held that:
even though the liquor control board regulation in question is neutral in its
terms, the results of its application in the case where the Constitution and
by-laws of a club required racial discrimination would be to invoke the
sanctions of the state to enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule.
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-179 (1972).
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That Section 9-503 is a manifestation of state policy and that the
creditor is given aid, comfort and/or incentive to repossess under
Section 9-503 is clear. Hence, self-help repossession involves state
action.
Reitman should, therefore, not be limited to cases dealing with
racial discriminations because this would emasculate the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor should it be distinguished on the ground that the
encouragement involved in Article 9 is less intentional than that in
Reitman, because the test for encouragement is whether "those practicing self-help repossessions need rely solely on their personal
choice." Since the creditor can now invoke statutory authority free
from censure or interference of any kind from official sources, the
state has encouraged self-help repossession and state action is present. Finally, Reitman should not be distinguished because Section
9-503 codifies the common law.
The fourth theory (Theory Four) which supports the thesis that
action under Section 9-503 constitutes state action, is that "the state
acts clearly enough when its legislature enacts legislation-. . .-"'', This
theory goes hand in hand with the maxim of construction that the
legislature does not enact futile legislation. As noted at 2 Sutherland
Statutory Constructions § 4510, p. 327,
A statute is a solemn enactment of a State acting through its legislature and it must be assumed that this process achieves an effective,
operative result. It cannot be presumed that the legislature would do
a futile thing.
The question that immediately springs to mind is: "What is the purpose of Section 9-503?" If the legislature did not mean to encourage
self-help repossession and to discourage judicial action, if the legislature did not mean to immunize private parties from the legal repercussions of repossession, what did the legislature intend to do? Is it
unreasonable to assume that the legislatures of 49 states did a "futile
thing" in enacting Section 9-503?
The fifth and final thesis (Theory Five) in support of state action
is one that was used successfully in the lower court case of Hall v
Garson 72 Hall involved an action challenging the constitutionality
of the Texas Landlord Lien statute. The Texas law authorized landlords to peremptorily seize their tenants property with no prior
judicial procedures to determine the validity of the landlord's claim
to rent. The defendant landlord's first contention was that the "requisite state action was not present since the television set was not
71. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083, 1086 (1960).
72. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
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seized by a state official but by the landlady." 7 3 The federal court
held that:
the seizure of another's property, was an act that possesses many, if
not all, of the characteristics of a state. The execution of a lien
whether a traditional security interest or a quasi writ of attachment
or a judgment
lien has in Texas traditionally been the function of
74
the state.

The court further found that the substantive difference between
seizure by an official pursuant to a writ issued by the state and
seizure by a private individual without a writ issued by state was only
a matter of form.'s
In summary, the thesis that action under Section 9-503 constitutes
state action, is supported by the following five arguments: First,
state action can be found in self-help repossession because action
under Section 9-503 is done pursuant to the enactment of a state law
which authorizes self-help repossession.' 6 Second, self-help repossession under Section 9-503 is state action when the state enforces a
contract between the parties which authorizes self-help repossession
-(the state enforces a contract between the parties by not declaring
it invalid in action in court). 7' Third, the action of self-help repossession under Section 9-503 is state action because the state encourages such action.' s Fourth, the state acts whenever it enacts legislation.' 9 And, fifth, the state acts when a private person repossesses
another person's private goods because repossession is a function of
the state and there is little substantive difference between repos73. Id. at 439.

74. Id. The holding of the Fifth Circuit in Hall v. Garson is fortified by the Supreme
Court holding in the case of Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1965) where it was held
that, "When private individuals or groups are empowered by the state with powers or
functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the state and
subject to its constitutional limitations."
75. The decision that there is no substantive difference in seizure by self-help
repossession and seizure pursuant to a state issued writ is supported by the case of
McCormick v. First NationalBank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1972). The lower
federal court in McCormick emphasized the fact that no distinction could be drawn between
replevin (which is seizure by a state official pursuant to a state issued writ) and self-help
repossession because both are based upon a private security agreement. It seems that if this
holding is correct, there is no choice but to hold § 9-503 unconstitutional as it violates due
process of law. This follows from the fact that replevin was recently declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Cf. Clark,
Default, Repossession, Foreclosure and Efficiency: A Journey to the Underworld and a
Proposed Solution, 51 Ore. L. Rev. 302, 330 (1972).
76. See page
of this Note.
77. See page
of this Note.
78. See page
of this Note.
79. See page
of this Note.
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session pursuant to a writ of replevin and seizure by a private individual. 8"
The outcome of any decision by the Supreme Court on the issue
of state action is difficult to predict. This is especially true since
self-help repossession is not entirely dependent upon Section 9-503,
but may be predicated upon an express term in a security agreement.
Further, the remedy is one long known to the common law. For
these reasons, the lower courts have divided on the issue of whether
the presence of Section 9-503 is so significant to the contents of a
security agreement as to make self-help repossession pursuant to such
an agreement action under color of law. The conclusion of this part
will take a brief look at one lower court case which has expressly
held Section 9-503 unconstitutional: Adams v. Egley. 8 ' The defendant in Adams contended that since the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action and since the
security agreement"2 was a private contract whose terms were self
executing, there was no significant state involvement such that the
prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment should be invoked. The
defendant also argued that unlike cases involving prejudgment attachment8 3 or replevin," 4 which required affirmative action by a state
official (i.e. the issuance of a writ, and in the case of replevin, the
seizure of property) the contract dealt with repossession by a private
person, a self-help remedy. The creditor or his agent is the one who is
authorized by the contract to remove the collateral without the aid
of any state official. Further, the defendant argued that the act of
repossession is not solely dependent upon the statutory authority
but is specifically provided for in the security agreement itself. The
taking was thus pursuant to the private contract with no state action
involved on which to base jurisdiction.
Deciding for the plaintiff, the district court held that the question
of jurisdiction was governed by the encouragement rationale of Reitman v. Mulkey." 5 The court felt that even though the repossession
was ostensibly a private act, accomplished pursuant to the contract,
the presence of Section 9-503 was significant in terms of its impact
on the contract's provisions. This conclusion was supported by the
fact that the security agreement itself specifically referred to the
California Commercial Code, thus indicating:
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

of this Note.
See page
Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
Id. at 616.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Fuentesv. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
387 U.S. 369 (1969).
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that in drawing up the agreement, the defendant creditors were
'persuaded or induced to include' repossession
by the fact that such
repossession was permitted statute c.f Evans v. Abney
435, 445. These commercial code sections set forth a state396 U.S.
policy,
and the Security Agreements upon which the instant actions
rest,
whose terms are authorized by the statute and which incorporate
its
provisions, are merely an embodiment of that policy. It is,
therefore,
apparent that the acts of repossession were made 'under
state law' as required by the Civil Rights Statute and the color of
passage of
9-503 and 9-504 which authorized such acts are sufficient
state
action to raise a federal question...
Even if an independent right to repossess is created by
the signed
security agreement, that right is created under authority of
state law,
and consequently does not defeat the jurisdiction of this court.8 6
Under the Reitman rationale and the Adams holding,
self-help
repossession represents a state policy which the
security agreement
embodies. Hence, there is sufficient state action to
decide the constitutionality of actions taken under Section 9-503.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The second part of this note is devoted to a discussion
of whether
or not peaceful repossesion as authorized by the
Uniform Commercial Code constitutes the taking of property without
due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment. This section
assumes for
purposes of argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
is applicable.
A complete analysis of the issue must include a discussion
as to the
following issues:
1. Is notice and hearing prior to self-help repossession required
by
the Fourteenth Amendment?
2. May this due process right, if it exists, be waived?
3. If it may be waived, does Section 9-503 provide for a constitutional waiver of any due process rights a debtor may possess?
4. If Section 9-503 does provide for a waiver of rights, is
such a
waiver effective in a contract of adhesion? 8 7
Preliminarily, one should observe that voluntary
adherence to
what would be an unconstitutional agreement
(if it were to be
enforced in court) is not unconstitutional or unlawful.
The Supreme
Court held in Shelley v. Kraemer 88 that
86. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
87. For a similar discussion concerning cognovit notes and
due process rights, see 2 Hart
and Willar, Commercial Paper under the Uniform Commercial
Code § 2.10 [21 at 2-56.
88. 334 U.S. 1 (1947); See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
31 (1947).
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a restrictive agreement standing alone cannot be regarded as violating
any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment.
So long as the purpose of those agreements are efficated by voluntary adherence to those terms, it would appear clear that there has
been no action by the state and that the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated. 8 9
The real question left open by Shelley is the meaning of the word
"voluntary." Does "voluntary" comport with the word "peaceful"
("without breach of the peace") as it is used in Section 9-503? Since
"voluntary" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "unconstrained
by interference; unimpelled by another's influence; spontaneous;
acting of oneself; done by design or intention," it would seem that
voluntary is not the same as peaceful, especially since peaceful in the
context of Section 9-503 merely means freedom from force or violence. It is not necessary under Section 9-503 that there be an unconstrained intent on the debtor's part to give up possession of the
collateral. For purposes of this part, it will be assumed that we are
dealing with those repossessions which are not voluntary and in
which the debtor has not knowingly, understandingly and with
notice given up possession of any collateral.
The starting point in any discussion of the constitutionality of
prejudgment remedies is the Supreme Court decision of Sniadach v
Family Finance Corp 90 In Sniadach the Supreme Court held that
prejudgment garnishment of wages was unconstitutional without a
prior hearing or notice.
Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice of a prior hearing
this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental
principles of due process. 9 '

9 2 where
The Sniadach rationale was followed in Goldberg v. Kelly,
the court held that "due process requires an adequate hearing before

the

termination

of welfare

benefits

. .

."

Interpreting Sniadach

broadly, a federal district court held in Adams v. Eglev that both
§ 9-503 and § 9-504 of the California Uniform Commercial Code
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because they allowed the taking
of property without notice and hearing. The Adams court reasoned
that Sniadach did not represent a special constitutional rule for
wages, but was a return of:
89.
90.
91.
92.

334 U.S. at 17.
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Id. at 342.
397 U.S. 254 (1969).
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...the entire domain of prejudgment remedies to the long-standing
procedural due process principle which dictates that except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual may not be deprived of his
life, liberty or property without notice and hearing.9 3

The Adams court viewed Sniadach as establishing a due process norm
requiring prior notice and hearing and allowing summary procedures
only in exceptional circumstances. Absent a compelling state interest, an individual must be afforded an opportunity to be heard
before he can be deprived of "some significant interest by operation
of law." Measuring this newly defined norm against the operation of
Section 9-503, the Adams court concluded that the debtor had been
denied due process since the statute could not be construed narrowly
enough to allow it to stand in any form. The court further held that
since Section 9-503 provided for repossession without notice or hearing, it was not exempt from constitutional scrutiny merely because
its operation was confined to situations involving the presence of a
contract.9 4
93. 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972). The court was quoting from the case of
Randone v. Appellate Dept., S Cal. 3d 536, 547, 96 Cal. Reptr. 709, 715, 488 P.2d 13, 19
(1971). The Randone decision was cited approvingly in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88
(1972).
94. Before turning to the most important Supreme Court decision on the issue of
whether notice and waiver are required prior to self-help repossession, Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) it might be helpful to look briefly at three lower court decisions that
concern the due process requirements for prejudgment repossession. The first important
decision involving prejudgment seizure of property is that of Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp.
109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The court in Klim held that the Innkeepers Lien Law was
unconstitutional because it failed to provide proper notice and hearing as required by due
process of law. This was true even though a private person (the landlord) deprived the
boarder of his property. To be noted is the fact that the law was held unconstitutional even
though it was only a codification of the common law innkeepers' lien. Another case
involving the validity of the Inkeepers Lien Law is that*of Collins v. Viceroy Hotel
Corporation, 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Again the seizure of property was by a
private person (an innkeeper). And again the court ruled that the Innkeepers Lien Law
which authorizes a hotel proprietor seizure of property without a hearing, either before the
seizure or after, was unconstitutional as a violation of due process in that "the hotel guest
was afforded no hearing at which he can contest the underlying claims." Id. at 397. Further
the court held that there were no extraordinary circumstances in this case in that "there is
no overriding interest in protecting a creditor's position in a simple creditor-deb tor relationship by such drastic procedures.... Since the Innkeepers Law authorized the seizure
of property without notice and hearing, they are unconstitutional as violative of the due
process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Since 9-503 involves private
repossessions without a hearing, under the Klim and Collins rationale, 9-SO3 violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, especially if there is no overriding interest in
protecting the creditor in a simple debtor-creditor relationship. 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Penn. 1970). See also Musseiman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Penn. 1972). Three cases
similar to Klim and Collins but involving Landlord-Tenant Law are Santiago v. McElroy, 319
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Penn. 1970), Delien v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972). In
both cases the courts held that distraint procedures (whereby the landlord held for sale the
tenant's property, that the landlord in his sole judgment felt rent was owing) constituted
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In Fuentes v.Shevin 9 5 the most recent case to consider prejudgment remedies, the Supreme Court extended the Sniadach rationale
and held that prejudgment replevin of goods was unconstitutional as
a deprivation of property without due process of law, because the
replevin law denied the right to an opportunity to be heard before
goods were taken. 9 6
Fuentes is at least impliedly an indication that the Adams court
correctly prognosticated the meaning and impact of Sniadach. It
appears that notice and hearing before taking is now the constitutionally required norm, and the first question as outlined above must
be answered affirmatively.
The second question outlined above must also be answered affirmatively. Even in Fuentes the court noted "that the hearing required
by due process is subject to waiver,

. . ."'

The court limited that

principle by requiring that any waiver must at the very least be clear
and knowing in order to be enforceable. Specifically, the waiver must
appear prominently in the contract in order for the court to presume
The purported waiver provision was a printed part of the form sales
contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees made
no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or
made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as a
waiver of constitutional rights.
...The conditional sales contracts here simply provided upon a
default that the seller "may take back, may retake, or may reposses
'merchandise' ". The contracts include nothing about the waiver of
a prior hearing. They did not indicate how or through what process,
a final judgment, self-help, prejudgment replevin, with a prior hearing or a prejudgment without a prior heating the seller could take
back the goods. Rather the purported waiver provisions here are no
more than a statement of the seller's rights to repossession upon the
occurrence of certain events.... The language of the purported

waiver did not waive the appellant's constitutional rights to a preseizure hearing of some kind.
a taking of property without due process of law insofar as the law permitted the defendants
to summarily seize and hold property of a tenant without prior notice or opportunity to be
heard. It should also be noted that the right to distress sales the self-help common law
remedy. 319 F. Supp. at 286.
95. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
96. The court held that, "If the right to notice and hearing is to serve its full purpose,
then it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented." Id. at 81.
97. 407 U.S. at 82. Note: This holding is more clearly set out in D. H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), where it was held that due process rights to notice and
hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to waiver. See also Adams v. Egley, 338 F.

Supp. 614, 616 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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The above-quoted language is important in the analysis of the
third issue of this part, that is, whether Section 9-503 by itself provides for an effective waiver of the right to prior notice and hearing.
For there to be a waiver of a prior hearing, the purported waiver
must at the least clearly appear in the contract. The Fuentes court,
not faced with the constitutionality of Section 9-503, did not consider the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code writes Section
9-503 into every secured contract (whether or not it actually
appears) "unless otherwise agreed." An argument could be made that
because 9-503 is written into the contract by the state, it provides
for a waiver of the right to prior notice and hearing. The often
repeated assertion that everyone is presumed to know the law of
his state could be used to buttress the argument. The most obvious
counterargument is that a waiver is not effective under Fuentes
unless specifically and clearly set out in the contract. If not set out
fully in the contract, Section 9-503 could not be effective as a waiver
simply because it did not appear on the face of the contract.
Assuming, however, that the state can "write" a waiver of constitutional rights into a contract falling within the Code, or that Section
9-503 is quoted in the contract, the question then becomes whether
the present language of Section 9-503 is sufficient to create an effective waiver when measured against the requirements of Fuentes. This
question should be answered in the negative.
In Fuentes the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for
determining whether a waiver is clear and knowing. The first part of
the test requires that the contract include language to the effect that
a prior hearing is waived. 98 Section 9-503 clearly fails to provide
such language. The second part of the test for determining whether a
waiver is clear requires that the contract language include "how, or
through what processes" the seller will take back the goods. This part
of the test is satisfied as Section 9-503 does provide for self-help.
However, since the first part is not complied with, any purported
waiver within the language of Section 9-503 is not clear enough to
meet the high standards set by Fuentes. Thus, the purported waiver
is "no more than a statement of the seller's right to repossession
upon the occurrence of certain rights.

.. ."

It does not waive the

"constitutional right to a preseizure hearing of some kind."
It could be argued that Section 9-503 meets both parts of the
two-fold test since it meets the second part of the test. Further, it
specifies that the entire process may be accomplished without
98. Note the language of the court which states, "'The contracts (in Fuentes) included
nothing about the waiver of a prior hearing."
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judicial intervention. Thus, Section 9-503 would waive the right to a
prior hearing by implication since self-help is accomplished without
judicial process. However, the Fuentes decision stated that the contract must explicitly provide that a hearing is waived. The waiver by
implication is, therefore, not effective. Since Section 9-503 does not
explicitly provide for a waiver of notice and a hearing prior to the
seizure of goods, it should be held ineffective as a waiver. The answer
to question three must therefore be no.
The fourth question presented by this Part is whether the state can
ever provide for or allow an effective waiver of prior rights in a
contract of adhesion. Such a contract would, if well drafted, routinely contain a waiver of notice and hearing rights. For purposes of
argument, it will be assumed that the purported waiver of notice and
prior hearing is clear. 9 As noted above, "the due process rights to
notice and hearing prior to civil judgment are subject to waiver.' 00
However, in D. R. Overmyer and Co. v. Frick Co.' o Swarb v.
Lennox,'2 and in Fuentes 103 the Supreme Court stated that,
"where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity
in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the
waiver provision, other legal consequences may ensue." The court
would not say what legal consequences might ensue, but it is probably a good guess in the present situation that waiver provisions
would be held unenforceable and unconstitutional because not
entered into "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly."' 04 Thus,
even if the waiver were clear, if it were unenforceable as against
public policy,' o s the average debtor would regain his constitutional
rights to a hearing with notice.
And, as a matter of good social policy the average debtor should
regain his rights because in the sale of consumer goods, form contracts are used (more than 94% of the time)' 06 which contain
language that most consumers do not and cannot understand. Sellers
99. See 4 Texas Tech. L. Rev. 23, 43 where it states that, "As a minimum, the clause
must certainly state the rights which it purports to waive." This means that language merely
;tating generally that " 'upon default, the secured party will have the right to retake the
goods' or statements of similar effect are not adequate."
100. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox 405
U.S. 191, 200 (1972).
101. 405 U.S. 174, 188-190 (1972).
102. 405 U.S. 191, 201 (1972).
103. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

104. 405 U.S. at 185.

105. For a good discussion of what constitutes the contract of adhesion, see Keesler,
2ontracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract. 43 Colum. L. Rev.
529, 632 (1943); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and DemocraticControl of Lawmaking
lower, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1971).
106. Slawson, supra note 105.
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of consumer goods generally occupy a superior bargaining position.
The consumer is given a take it or leave it choice with no additional
"consideration" for signing a waiver of notice and hearing.'
07 These
problems might be overcome if the seller explained the contract
waiver provisions and provided a different price for those who signed
waivers. A valid waiver under these conditions would be more acceptable. Many sellers might balk at such procedures because of cost
considerations. It would require cost analysis on the sellers' part to
determine which was more expensive-prior explanation of the
waiver or judicial action after default.
Although the Supreme Court provides little help in determining
the effect of contracts of adhesion on waiver of constitutional rights,
two lower court decisions do address the problem. Both hold that
purported waivers of constitutional rights are ineffective when found
in a contract of adhesion. In Seller v. Contino "0 8 the court (which
also declared the Landlord Lien Law unconstitutional because no
notice of prior hearing was provided) held that:
there can be no presumption from the signing of leases that poor
tenants understandingly and knowingly waive their constitutional
rights to such notice and hearing by the inclusion in the lease of
clauses such as paragraph 8 of the McGehean Lease.' 0 9
In the second case Santiago v. McElroy,' I I the court held that in a
contract of adhesion there can be no waiver of one's constitutional
rights to a hearing. The defendant in Santiago argued that a taking of
the property was pursuant to a lease which expressly waived the
defendant's rights to a hearing. The court held, however, that:
insofar as this provision (the provision permitting levies and sales of
tenants' property on default) constitutes a purported waiver of the
right to raise objections on constitutional grounds to the statutory
distress procedures, we feel that it is only effective if it qualifies as
"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or
privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). We take
judicial notice the fact that form leases are put before tenants on an
"accept this or get nothing" basis, see 6A Corbin, Contracts § 1376
(1962) and that tenants-who need housing-are compelled to sign.
There is no freedom of contract, there is merely a freedom to adhere
to the terms of the contract written by the landlord. See Swarb v.
Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E. D. Pa. 1970); Ehrenzweig Adhesion
107. Slawson, supra note 105, at 530.
108. 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Penn. 1971).
109. Id. at 234. The lease provided that "the lessee agrees that all goods and property
under the demised premises shall be liable to distress for rent."
110. 338 F. Supp. 390, 398 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
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Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Col. L. Rev. 1072 (1953).
Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs have not waived their right to
object on constitutional grounds to the statutory distress procedure.'''

Thus, under Santiago and Seller, if self-help repossession provisions
are not entered into voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly, any
purported waiver of the right to notice and hearing would (at the
least) be invalid as against public policy, unenforceable and unconstitutional.'

1

Support for this conclusion also comes from the legal presumption
against a waiver of constitutional rights.' 'I It should not be presumed that one has waived his constitutional rights to notice and
hearing in a contract of adhesion. Even if the waiver provided by
Section 9-503 is effective between parties of equal bargaining
strength,' ' it should not be effective in instances where a contract
of adhesion is involved, for, as noted by the Supreme Court of
California in the case of Blair v Pitchess. '
the weaker party in need of goods or services is frequently not in a
position to shop around for better terms, either because the
author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual
intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to the terms
dictated by the stronger party; terms whose consequences are more
often understood in a vague way, if at all.
Section 9-503 must, therefore, be declared unconstitutional because it fails to provide for notice and hearing prior to seizure.
Further, even if it is constitutional it should be unenforceable as
there is no clear waiver of the constitutional rights to hearing and
notice. Finally, even if the waiver is clear, Section 9-503 should be
held unenforceable in contracts of adhesion or in contracts where the
waiver is not entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,
because of the presumption against the waiver of one's constitutional
rights. If the constitutional notice and hearing are made non-waiveable, the seller could proceed peacefully with permission of the
111. 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
112. See text accompanying note 105, supra.
113. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); D.
H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1971); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
114. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1971).
115. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 54, 486, P.2d 1242, 1254 (1971). The court cited
Kessler, Contractsof Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,43 Colum. L.

Rev. 629, 632 (1943).
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buyer or by action thus guaranteeing the buyer his constitutional
rights to notice and hearing prior to being deprived of his property.' 16
If state action is found in self-help repossession as authorized by
Section 9-503, and if Section 9-503 does not provide for a constitutional waiver of the right to prior notice and hearing (at least in
contracts of adhesion), the court will want to examine and balance
certain interests in determining the constitutionality of Section
9-503. In early cases dealing with the due process requirements of
notice and hearing, the court found that it was confronted with
property of a "special nature."' '7 However, the Court in the Overmyer Swarb and Fuentes cases rejected or at least ignored the interest analysis of the earlier cases. In these latter cases, the court
accepted the due process standard that notice and hearing are required in the absence of extraordinary situations.' I' In fact,
Fuentes explicitly refrained from using a balancing test holding that
the due process requirements of a hearing cannot be limited by considerations of efficiency.' 19 It may be that the court felt that the
interest weighed so heavily in favor of the debtor, that no discussion
was necessary. The discussion of "extraordinary situations" in
Fuentes, however, indicates that in some circumstances the cost of
the hearing may outweigh any harm suffered by the debtor.' 20
According to the leading treatise on the Code, "it would be unwise
to interpret this deviation from the court's more traditional approach
to these problems as an acceptance by the court of an absolute due
process standard with personal or property interests.' 1 21 The relative interest of the debtor in prior notice and hearing and the relative
interest of the creditor in self-help repossession will thus be briefly

identified.'

2 2

116. See note, Self-Help Repossession of Consumer Goods: A Constitutional

Look at
§ 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 439, 455 (1973).
This
note includes a discussion of how a hearing might be conducted by an administrative
agency
so as to conserve both constitutional rights and costs.
117. Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 264-266 (1970); Sniadach v.
Family Finance

Corporation, 395 U.S. 337, 341-342 (1969).
118. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
119. Id. at 90-91 n. 22.

120. The extraordinary situation discussed involved situations of great
danger to the
public. The court held that "summary seizure of a person's possessions
with no more than
private gain is directly at stake" would not be permitted. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 92
(1972).
121. 2 Hart and Wilier, Commercial Paper Under the Uniform Commercial
Code § 2.10
[2] Page 2-57.
122. The balancing test has been formulated in prior Supreme Court cases
as follows:
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner
in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives
to
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The creditor is possessed of several important interests, all of
which are economic: (1) continuous payments (which are encouraged by the threat of self-help repossession); (2) prevention of
damage or deterioration of the goods; and (3) if he should have to
repossess, prevention of removal or concealment of the goods.' 2 3
The debtor meanwhile has a strong interest in prior notice and hearings so that self-help repossession does not work an unjust deprivation on him and his family, especially if the goods repossessed are
necessities. The debtor may have a valid reason for his refusal to
continue payments. Breaches of warranty are recognized under the
Code as reasons for suspension of performance by the buyer. 1 4
However, if the seller is allowed to repossess without a hearing, the
buyer must initiate a court proceeding which may cost more than the
goods are worth.' 2 5
A balancing of the interests of the debtor who may be wrongfully
deprived of his property is further complicated by the costs incurred
by the state if creditors are forced to resort to the courts whenever
there is a default. The state's, as well as the debtor's, cost take the
form of higher interest rates, lower availability of credit, and extra
litigation,' 2 6 which seizure without hearing and notice help reduce.
The cost of higher interest rates and lower availability of credit is
suggested by almost every legal commentator who has dealt with
self-help repossession.' 2 However, none has supported his assertions with any empirical studies. Several studies on the subject
have concluded that there is no reason to believe that prior notice
and hearing would affect the availability of consumer credit.' 2 8 It is
the procedure that was followed ... the balance of the hurt complained of
and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter
into the judicial judgment. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter J. concurring.).
123. The court in Fuentes recognized that the interests of the creditor may override that
:f the debtor if the creditor could show an immediate danger that a debtor would destroy

r conceal disputed goods. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972).
(1972).
124. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 314.
125. See note 116 supra at 453.
126. See Hogan, The Secured Party in Default Proceedingsunder the Uniform Commer:ial Code, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 205, 211 (1962); Comment, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 435

(1969).
127. See, e.g. Comment, Self-Help Remedies after Fuentes v. Shevin, 47 Fla. BJ. 155

(1973).
128. Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corporation, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 837, 846 (1970); Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 Cal. L. Rev. 1214, 1240-1242
(1965). Comment, A Due Process Prescription,45 Temp. L. Q. 259, 274 (1972); Randone
v. Appellate Dep't of Supreme Court of Sacramento Co. 96 Cal. Rptr. 709,488 P.2d 13, 26
(1971). The cry is also made that without the right of self-help, the bankruptcy rate will rise
because creditors will throw their debtors into bankruptcy or law suits by creditors will
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suggested by two commentators that even if the cost of consumer
credit were to rise, that this might be in the public interest since it
would discourage those creditors who are prone to over-extend
credit. It would further discourage those debtors who are prone to
overextend themselves.1 2 9
The state's interest in extra litigation was raised in several lower
court cases which pointed out that the cost of a prerepossession
hearing would be prohibitively high. This contention was answered in
the case of Goldberg v. Kelly.' ' " The court held there that the
governmental interest in conserving physical administrative resources
are not overriding interests.
Thus the interest of the eligible recipients in uninterrupted receipt of
public assistance coupled with the state's interest that the payments
not be erroneously terminated clearly outweighs the state's competing concern to prevent any increases in its physical and its administrative burdens. 13
Rephrased and applied to Section 9-503, one would note that the
interest the debtor has in uninterrupted and peaceful repossession of
his goods, coupled with the state's interest in peaceful enjoyment of
his property, clearly outweighs the state's competing interest to
prevent any increase in its physical and administrative burdens.
If the debtor is wrongfully deprived of his property, disrespect for
a system of justice which allows such repossessions is an interest the
state must also protect. Finally, the state and the debtor share the
common interest of preventing non-peaceful and under-handed
means of repossession. The interest of the debtor and the state in
prior notice is, of course, of concern only if the repossession is
unjust.
Balancing those interests is difficult indeed. Balancing is further
complicated by the fact that the court has frequently protected the
interest of the minority as well as the majority.' 32 However, there
seems to be no overriding interest in protecting a creditor's position
in a simple debtor-creditor relationship by such drastic procedures as
force debtors into bankruptcy. This contention has also been proven invalid
in the Brunn

article.

129. See Note, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 986, 987 (1970); Comment, 45 Temp.
L. Q. 259,
274-275 (1972); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, of Supreme Court of Sacramento
Co., 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13, 26 (1971).
130. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
131. Id. at 266. See also Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 285 (E.D.
Penn. 1970);
Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill'. 1972).
132. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 370 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S.
254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Miranda
v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). This assumes that criminal standards apply.
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self-help repossession.' 3 I The small economic benefits derived from
the use of self-help, the close similarity between self-help and prejudgment replevin, and the detrimental effects self-help can have on a
debtor strongly suggest that the balance of interest rests with the
debtor in preserving his rights to prior notice and hearing. The interests that prevailed in both Sniadach and Fuentes are not any less
present in a judgment concerning self-help repossession, and the
interest that the state and the creditor possessed in both Fuentes and
Sniadach are not any more substantial in self-help repossession.
Finally, the due process norm as established in Fuentes and Sniadach
is notice and hearing. Only in extraordinary situations may this norm
be violated by summary seizure. The burden is on the creditor to
justify self-help as an extraordinary situation. As in Sniadach and
Fuentes "where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs
no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior
hearing (Article 9-503) ...violates the fundamental principles of due
process.'" 31

Although the Fuentes case is not definitive, it does cast serious
doubt on the constitutionality of self-help repossessions. If a prejudgment taking of property by way of a writ of replevin is unconstitutional because of a failure to notify the debtor and give him an
opportunity to be heard, then the creditor should not be allowed to
by-pass that protective rule and repossess privately without a hearing.1 3 5 Neither should the creditor be allowed to thwart the constitutional assault on Section 9-503 by placing a provision in a
consumer contract which supposedly allows self-help repossession
without prior judicial action, unless the creditor can show an
effective waiver of the procedural due process rights to hearing and
notice. The creditor should have the burden of showing that the
waiver was clear,'

36

voluntary,' 3' intelligently and competently

made, 3 8 that the debtor was fully aware of the consequences of his
waiver and that the debtor intentionally relinquished or abandoned
his known right to prior notice and hearing under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 39
133. Cy note 93 supra.
134. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
135. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972).
136. Id. at 95. See also 17 St. Louis U.L.J. 127, 136 (1972).
137. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). See also 17 St. Louis
U.L.J. 127, 136 (1972).
138. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture
Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 724 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); See also 17 St. Louis U.L.J. 127, 136 (1972).
139. Brookhart v. Javis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938). See also 17 St. Louis U.L.J. 127, 136 (1972).
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The determination of the constitutionality of Section 9-503 will
turn on whether the notice and hearing requirements as established
by Sniadach, Goldberg and Fuentes were meant to grant the debtor
basic constitutional protections against the seizure of property or
whether the decisions merely stand for the proposition that the
courts may not participate in this type of proceedings. If the constitutional rule established by Fuentes is only that courts may not take
part in these proceedings, then the creditor may "take the law into
his own hands," through self-help repossessions, notwithstanding any
contract and notwithstanding any basic unfairness in the repossessions. Section 9-503 will stand. However, if Fuentes is aimed at the
basic inequality and unfairness of prejudgment repossession, then
Section 9-503 must be declared unconstitutional or at least of no
effect in contracts of adhesion. Section 9-503 would then be relegated to history and the creditor would be forced to instigate court
action with appropriate notice and hearings.' 0
STEVEN KURT SANDERS

140. If the trend of protecting consumers and indigent persons continues, it is believed
that it will be held unconstitutional, unlawful, contrary to public policy, or unconscionable
for a creditor to repossess the collateral without affording the debtor some opportunity to
be heard. The fact that the courts are not involved in such self-help is not any assurance of
the continued validity of the right of non-judicial repossession. If repossession without a
hearing is wrong, is it any the less a wrong when the creditor acts on his own and the courts
are not involved? Likewise, if repossession without a hearing is wrong, does it not become
wrong for the state to tell the creditor by way of U.C.C. § 9-503 that he can repossess
without a hearing as long as he doesn't go to court? Revolutionary as is the conclusion that
repossession is unlawful, it is believed that the conclusion is an inevitable and logical development from the Fuentes decision. 4 Anderson on Uniform Commercial Code 133, 1972-73
Cummulative Supplement.

